2013 Pensions Policy
State-specific analysis and recommendations for pension goals coming later this year. For past analysis and recommendations of Washington's teacher pension system see the last comprehensive Washington State Teacher Policy Yearbook.
Anachronistic features of teacher pension plans disadvantage teachers early in their careers.
Nearly all states continue to provide teachers with a defined benefit pension system, an expensive and inflexible model that neither reflects the realities of the modern workforce nor provides equitable benefits to all teachers. To achieve the maximum benefits from such a plan, a teacher must begin and end his or her career in the same pension system. Teachers who leave before vesting—which is as much as 10 years in some states—are generally entitled to nothing more than their own contributions plus some interest. This approach may well serve as a retention strategy for some, but on a larger scale it fails to reflect the realities of the current workforce. The current workforce is increasingly mobile, with most entering the workforce expecting to change jobs many times. All workers, including teachers, may move to jobs in other states with no intention of changing careers. To younger teachers in particular, a defined benefit plan may seem like a meaningless part of the compensation package and thus fail to attract young talent to the profession. A pension plan that cannot move across state lines and that requires a long-term commitment may not seem like much of a benefit at all.
There are alternatives. Defined contribution plans are fair to all teachers at all points in their careers. These plans are more equitable because each teacher's benefits are funded by his or her own contributions plus contributions from the employer specifically on the individual employee's behalf. This is fundamentally more equitable than defined benefit plans, which are generally structured to require new teachers to fund the benefits of retirees. Moreover, defined contribution plans are inherently portable and give employees flexibility and control over their retirement savings. It must also be noted that defined benefit plans can be portable and fair, if structured as cash balance plans or plans that permit the withdrawal of employer contributions.
Pension Flexibility: Supporting ResearchNCTQ's analysis of the financial sustainability of state pension system is based on actuarial benchmarks promulgated by government and private accounting standards boards. For more information see U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007, 30 and Government Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 25.
For an overview of the current state of teacher pensions, the various incentives they create, and suggested solutions, see R. Costrell and M. Podgursky. "Reforming K-12 Educator Pensions: A Labor Market Perspective." TIAA-CREF Institute, Policy Brief, February 2011.
For evidence that retirement incentives do have a statistically significant effect on retirement decisions, see J. Furgeson, R. Strauss, and W. Vogt. "The Effects of Defined Benefit Pension Incentives and Working Conditions on Teacher Retirement Decisions", Education Finance and Policy, Volume 1, No. 3, Summer 2006, pp. 316-348.
For examples of how teacher pension systems inhibit teacher mobility, see R. Costrell and M. Podgursky, "Golden Handcuffs," Education Next, Volume 10, No. 1, Winter 2010, pp. 60-66.
For additional information on state pension systems, see S. Loeb and L. Miller. "A Review of State Teacher Policies: What Are They, What Are Their Effects, and What Are Their Implications for School Finance?" Stanford University: Institute for Research on Education Policy and Practice, December 2006; and J. Hansen, "Teacher Pensions: A Background Paper", published through the Committee for Economic Development, May 2008.
For further evidence supporting NCTQ's teacher pension standards, see "Public Employees' Retirement System of the State of Nevada: Analysis and Comparison of Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Retirement Plans." The Segal Group, Inc., 2010.