Pension Sustainability: Nevada

2015 Pensions Policy

Goal

The state should ensure that excessive resources are not committed to funding teachers' pension systems.

Does not meet
Suggested Citation:
National Council on Teacher Quality. (2015). Pension Sustainability: Nevada results. State Teacher Policy Database. [Data set].
Retrieved from: https://www.nctq.org/yearbook/state/NV-Pension-Sustainability-74

Analysis of Nevada's policies

As of June 30, 2015, the most recent date for which a financial report is available, Nevada's pension system for teachers is 73.2 percent funded, an increase of 2.0 percentage points since NCTQ's last report. Its current pension debt exceeds $27,000 per pupil throughout the state. The plan's amortization period is unknown as it is not reported in its annual financial report. This is the number of years to pay off its unfunded liabilities if the plan earns its assumed rate of return and makes its full actuarially determined contribution payments. The state's funding ratio does not meet conventional standards, and the state's system is not financially sustainable according to actuarial benchmarks.

Nevada commits excessive resources toward its teachers' retirement system. Local districts choose between two funding options—the Employer Pay Contribution Plan (ERPaid) and the Employee/Employer Contribution Plan (EES/ERS)—with most districts electing to participate in ERPaid. Each of these plans are cost-equivalent. The current employer contribution to the ERPaid plan through FY 2017 of 29.00 percent appears very high. In place of a direct employee contribution, however, teachers share exactly one-half of the employer contribution rate through salary reduction or by foregoing an equivalent pay raise. Thus, the employer rate is effectively 14.50 percent under the ERPaid plan. Teachers and employing school districts negotiate which of the two cost-sharing mechanisms they will use in their contracts.

Under the EES/ERS Plan, teachers and districts also share equally in the contribution, each contributing 14.00 percent. The rates for both the ERPaid and EES/ERS are excessive, considering that neither districts nor teachers make additional contributions to Social Security.

Citation

Recommendations for Nevada

Ensure that the pension system is financially sustainable.
The state would be better off if its system was over 95 percent funded to allow more protection during financial downturns. Nevada, however, should consider ways to improve its funding level without greatly increasing the contributions of school districts and teachers. Committing excessive resources to pension benefits can negatively affect teacher recruitment and retention and crowd out funding for other areas in education. Improving funding levels necessitates, in part, systemic changes in the state's pension system. The goals on pension flexibility and pension neutrality provide suggestions for pension system structures that are both sustainable and fair.


State response to our analysis

Nevada did not respond to repeated requests to review this analysis.

How we graded

Research rationale

Many states' pension systems are based on promises they cannot afford to keep.

Teacher salaries are just one part of the compensation package that teachers receive. Virtually all teachers are also entitled to a pension, which, upon vesting, provides compensation for the rest of their lives after retirement. In an era when retirement benefits have been shrinking across industries and professions, teachers' generous pensions remain fixed. In fact, nearly all states continue to provide teachers with a defined-benefit pension system, an expensive and inflexible model that neither reflects the realities of the modern workforce nor provides equitable benefits to all teachers.

Under defined benefit systems, states have made an obligation to fund fixed benefits for teachers at retirement. However, the financial health and sustainability of many states' systems are questionable at best. Some systems carry high levels of unfunded liabilities, with no strategy to pay these liabilities down in a reasonable period, as defined by standard accounting practices. Without reform, these systems are a house of cards, vulnerable to collapse as funding cannot keep up with promised benefits. And it is taxpayers who will have to pay if it all tumbles down.

Pension plans disadvantage teachers early in their careers by overcommitting employer resources to retirement benefits.

The contribution of employers to their workers' retirement benefits is a valuable benefit, important to ensuring that individuals have sufficient retirement savings. Compensation resources, however, are not unlimited, and they must fund both current salaries and future retirement benefits. Mandated employer contributions to many states' teacher pension systems are extremely high, leaving districts with little flexibility to be more innovative with their compensation strategies. This is further exacerbated for states in which teachers also participate in Social Security, requiring the district to pay even more toward teacher retirement. While retirement savings in addition to Social Security are necessary, states are mandating contributions to two inflexible plans rather than permitting options for teachers or their employing districts.

This approach to compensation disadvantages teachers early in their careers, as the commitment of resources to retirement benefits almost certainly depresses salaries and prevents incentives. Lower mandatory employer contribution rates (in states where they are too high; in some states they are shamefully low) would free up compensation resources to implement the kinds of strategies suggested elsewhere in the Yearbook. In addition, some states require high employee contributions; the impact this has on teachers' paychecks may affect retention, especially early in teachers' careers.

Pension Sustainability: Supporting Research

NCTQ's analysis of the financial sustainability of state pension system is based on actuarial benchmarks promulgated by government and private accounting standards boards. For more information see U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007,  30 and Government Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 25.

For an overview of the current state of teacher pensions, the various incentives they create, and suggested solutions, see Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky. " Reforming K-12 Educator Pensions: A Labor Market Perspective." TIAA-CREF Institute (2011).

For evidence that retirement incentives do have a statistically significant effect on retirement decisions, see Joshua Furgeson, Robert P. Strauss, and William B. Vogt. " The Effects of Defined Benefit Pension Incentives and Working Conditions on Teacher Retirement Decisions", Education Finance and Policy (Summer, 2006).

For examples of how teacher pension systems inhibit teacher mobility, see Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky, " Golden Handcuffs," Education Next, (Winter, 2010).

For additional information on state pension systems, see Susanna Loeb, and Luke Miller. " State Teacher Policies: What Are They, What Are Their Effects, and What Are Their Implications for School Finance?" Stanford University: Institute for Research on Education Policy and Practice (2006); and Janet Hansen, "Teacher Pensions: A Background Paper", published through the Committee for Economic Development (May, 2008).

For further evidence supporting NCTQ's teacher pension standards, see " Public Employees' Retirement System of the State of Nevada: Analysis and Comparison of Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Retirement Plans." The Segal Group (2010).